Increasing competition for water across sectors increases the importance of the river basin as the appropriate unit of analysis to address the challenges facing water resources management; and modeling at this scale can provide essential information for policymakers in their resource allocation decisions. This paper introduces an integrated economichydrologic modeling framework that accounts for the interactions between water allocation, farmer input choice, agricultural productivity, nonagricultural water demand, and resource degradation in order to estimate the social and economic gains from improvement in the allocation and efficiency of water use. The model is applied to the Maipo River Basin in Chile. Economic benefits to water use are evaluated for different demand management instruments, including markets in tradable water rights, based on production and benefit functions with respect to water for the agricultural and urbanindustrial sectors.
INTRODUCTION
With growing scarcity and increasing competition for water across sectors, the need for efficient, equitable, and sustainable water allocation policies has increased in importance in water resources management. These policies can best be examined at the river basin level, which link essential hydrologic, economic, agronomic, and institutional relationships as well as water uses and users and their allocation decisions.
To carry out this analysis, an integrated economic-hydrologic modeling framework at the basin level has been developed that accounts for the interactions between water allocation, farmer input choice, agricultural productivity, nonagricultural water demand, and resource degradation in order to estimate the social and economic gains from improvement in the allocation and efficiency of water use. An application to the Maipo River Basin in Chile is presented. The following sections give an overview on the research site, introduce the modeling framework, and present results of the model application.
THE MAIPO RIVER BASIN
The Maipo River Basin, located in a key agricultural region in the metropolitan area of central Chile, is a prime example of a "mature water economy" (see Randall 1981 ) with growing water shortages and increasing competition for scarce water resources across sectors. The basin is characterized by a very dynamic agricultural sector-serving an irrigated area of about 127,000 ha (out of a total catchment area of 15 In the mid-1990s, total water withdrawals at the off-take level in the Maipo River
Basin were estimated at 2,144 million m 3 . Agriculture accounted for 64% of total withdrawals, domestic uses for 25%, and industry for the remaining 11%. The basin includes 8 large irrigation districts with areas of 1,300-45,000 ha. Irrigated area in the basin has been gradually declining due to increasing demands by the domestic and industrial sectors for both water and land resources, among other factors. By the mid-70s, urban Santiago had already encroached on more than 30,000 ha of productive irrigated land (Court Moock et al. 1979 ). However, the closeness to the capital city also provides a profitable outlet for high-value crop production both for the local market and for the dynamic export sector.
The largest municipal water company, Empresa Metropolitan de Obras Sanitarias (EMOS), supplies about 85% of Santiago's population as well as other urban areas. It owns about 17% of the volume of flow in the upper Maipo River, plus the storage of the El Yeso reservoir with a capacity of about 256 million m 3 (Donoso 1997) . Supplies for industrial consumption are drawn from the drinking-water distribution networks as well as from privately owned wells and, in a few cases, from irrigation canals. All hydropower stations in the basin are of the run-of-the river type.
Competition among the different water users and uses, in particular, agriculture and domestic and industrial water uses, is increasing rapidly. According to Anton (1993) , agricultural areas are mostly flood irrigated, and irrigation efficiencies range from 20% to 60% depending on local conditions. EMOS estimates an increase in domestic water demand of about 330 million m 3 between 1997 and 2022, which it intends to meet chiefly through better use of existing water rights, the purchase of additional rights from irrigation districts, and additional extraction of groundwater. However, in the past, EMOS has been unable to purchase sufficient shares from irrigation districts, and both industry and agriculture are competing for groundwater sources at levels surpassing the recharge capacities of the aquifers in the Metropolitan area (Hearne 1998; Bolelli 1997 ). Moreover, increasing competition for scarce water resources in the basin has led to growing pollution problems that have yet to be addressed by policy solutions (Anton 1993) . Although Chile has established the economic instrument of markets in tradable water rights following the Water Law of 1981, which promotes the allocation of water to the uses with the highest values, room for improvement in the areas of water rights for environmental and hydropower (non-consumptive) uses has become evident. These challenges in the Maipo basin will be addressed with the integrated economic-hydrologic modeling framework introduced in the following.
THE RIVER BASIN MODEL

MODELING APPROACH
The river basin modeling system is developed as a node-link network, in which nodes represent physical entities and links represent the connection between these entities The function, with specific parameters that have been estimated for all crops in the model, is directly used in the optimization model to calculate crop yields with varying water application, salt concentration, and CUC.
The crop yield function is specified as follows: technology improvement cost, and water supply cost. The function for profits from irrigation (VA) at demand site dm is specified as follows: 
where power is the power production, for each power station and period (KWh), which is a function of water flow for runoff stations, and of water release and reservoir head for stations with dams, as well as hydropower generating capacity and efficiency; pprice is the price of power production for each power station (US$/KWh); and pcost is the cost of power production, for each power station (US$/KWh).
The model also includes a series of institutional rules, including minimum required water supply to a demand site, minimum and maximum crop production, flow requirement through a river reach for environmental and ecological purposes, and maximum allowed salinity in the water system. The objective is to maximize economic profit from water supply for irrigation, M&I water use, and hydroelectric power generation, subject to institutional, physical, and other constraints. The objective function is specified as follows:
where wgt denotes the weight for the penalty and penalty is defined as:
where, over all demand sites and crops, pm is the maximum crop production (mt), cpprice is the crop selling price (US$/mt), mdft is the maximum stage deficit within a crop growth season, adft is the average stage deficit within a crop growth season.
where dft is the stage deficit ky is the yield response factor E a is the actual evapotranspiration (mm), as defined in Doorenbos and Kassam (1979) .
MODEL SOLUTION
The model has been coded in the modeling language of the General Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS) (Brooke et al., 1988) , a high-level modeling system for mathematical programming problems. Since the model is highly nonlinear and includes a large number of variables and equations, it is solved in two steps. In the first step, the salinity variable is fixed. The solution of this model is used for the initial values of the variables in the second model with variable salt concentration (see Cai, 1999 ).
RESULTS AND POLICY ANALYSIS
The focus of the modeling in this paper is on the agriculture sector and to a lesser extent on the nonagricultural water sectors. Note: Actual production is average for 1994-96. As crop diversity in the basin is extremely high, some crops are averages of aggregate production of similar crops. Peach, for example, includes almond, apricot, cherry, nectarines, peach, and plum. Source of actual production data: Donoso 1997. changes in hydrologic levels, irrigation technology cost, crop price, and source salinity (Table 3) . According to the sensitivity analyses, M&I water withdrawals and benefits barely change with the changing range of technology cost, crop price, and source salinity under conditions of normal flow. This is because, at normal inflows, the M&I demand sites can withdraw up to their benefit-maximizing level within the varying range of those parameters. However, M&I withdrawals and benefits do vary in the dry-year case (see Table 4 ).
With a reduction of normal inflows by half, water withdrawals and benefits for both agricultural and M&I demand sites decline sharply. Agricultural profits decrease by 37%
and M&I benefits decline by 9% compared to normal inflows. Moreover, water withdrawals plunge by 42% for irrigation and by 13% in M&I demand sites. Thus, in the case of drought, the agriculture sector is much more affected. Agricultural water withdrawals are not sensitive to the cost of irrigation technology and profits from irrigation Note: Sensitivity analyses, except for the inflow scenarios, were carried out based on normal flow. All percentages are relative to the baseline. However, farmer incomes from irrigation are significantly affected. With a reduction of crop prices by 25%, irrigation water withdrawals decline by 5%, whereas profits from irrigation drop by 60%.
A doubling of the source salinity leads to an increase in irrigation water withdrawals for salt leaching by 5%. Increased salt leaching reduces profits from irrigation by 14%. Moreover, changes in the salinity level influence crop patterns, with a decline in the harvested area of crops with lower salt tolerance. With doubled source salinity, the area planted to maize declines to 8% from 10% of total area planted at the 'baseline' source salinity of 0.3 g/l, whereas the area planted with wheat-a more salt tolerant cropincreases to 18% from 15% in the basin-optimizing case. Table 4 shows the effects of changes in the water price for agriculture on water The integrated economic-hydrologic river basin model allows for a fairly realistic representation and analysis of water markets. Water trading in the basin is constrained by the hydrologic balance in the river basin network; water is traded taking account of the physical and technical constraints of the various demand sites, reflecting their relative profitability in trading prices; water trades reflect the relative seasonal water scarcity in the basin that is influenced by both basin inflows and the cropping pattern in agricultural demand sites (whereas the M&I water demands are more stable); and negative externalities, like increased salinity in downstream reaches due to incremental irrigation water withdrawals upstream, are endogenous to the model framework.
Model Formulation for Water Trading
To extend the model to water trading analysis, the relationship between the shadow price of water and water withdrawal is first determined for each demand site. Water rights are allocated proportionally to total inflows based on historical withdrawals for M&I areas and on the harvested (irrigated) area for agricultural demand sites. Thus, with reduced inflows, the realized volumes of the water rights change without changes in the rights structure. The water right refers to surface water only. To determine the lower bound for profits from water trade by demand site (it is assumed that no demand site can lose from trading), the model is solved for the case of water rights without trading.
Finally, the regression relationships of shadow price vs. water withdrawal for all agricultural and M&I demand sites, the water rights, and other water trading related constraints (see Rosegrant et al. 1999 ) are added to the basin model. It is 
Water Trading Analysis
Three scenarios are compared to assess the impact of water trading: a baseline with omniscient decision-maker optimizing benefits for the entire basin (BO); water rights with no trading permitted (WR), and water rights with trading (WRT). The salinity variable is fixed for all three water-trading scenarios. The results compare two cases for each of these three scenarios: hydrologic level at 100% of the normal inflow and at 60% of the normal inflow (Table 5 ). In addition, three transaction cost scenarios are analyzed based on normal inflow (Table 6 ). The description of results will concentrate on the drought-year scenario (Case B, 60% of normal inflow), as the benefits vary more clearly by economic instrument employed.
In the case of a drought year, total water withdrawals are highest for the basin optimizing case (BO), as each and every demand site can withdraw according to its monthly needs subject to an optimum result for the basin as a whole. These needs are thus only confined by physical parameters, such as relative location in the basin and institutional requirements. Water withdrawals decline substantially in the WR case, relative to BO, when withdrawals are limited to the respective water right and trading is not allowed. When water can be traded, irrigation withdrawals actually decline further, albeit not very much. Irrigation withdrawals decline because the irrigation districts sell part of their water right to the M&I demand sites, thereby reaping substantial profits. In the dry-year case, a total water volume of 296 million m 3 is traded, about 11% of total dry-year inflows.
In the case of normal inflows, 264 million m 3 of water is traded, about 6% of total inflow.
M&I areas are the main buyers in both cases, purchasing virtually all the water offered by the irrigation districts. All irrigation districts are net sellers of water over the course of the year.
Under the drought-year case, only district A8 purchases 0.2 million m 3 of water to maintain its cropping pattern that features the largest share of higher-valued, perennial crops (grapes, peach, among others, see Table 2 ). In the case of normal inflows, on the other hand, the marginal value of water is much lower, and two agricultural demand sites, A6 and A8, purchase water (0.2 million m 3 and 10.8 million m 3 , respectively) to supplement their crop production in some months; however, overall both districts are net sellers of water.
As the WR system does not allow the transfer of water to more beneficial uses, benefits from water uses are significantly reduced by locking the resource into relatively low valued uses during shortages. As a result, total net benefits are less than one-half of the optimizing solution (US$389 million compared with US$874 million). By permitting trading, water moves from less productive agricultural uses into higher-valued urban water uses while at the same time benefiting farm incomes. Total benefits in the M&I demand sites almost triple, compared to the WR case, but gains are also significant for the irrigation districts and each district can increase net profits, by between 6% and 62%, depending on their respective physical and other characteristics. Total net profits of the sector increase by about 20%, from US$253 million to US$301 million. In irrigation districts A1-A5 and A7, total net profits under the WRT scenario are even higher than for the basin-optimizing case. This is due to the higher value of the scarcer water and the resulting benefits from trade and does not occur in Case A with normal inflow levels.
Moreover, net profits from crop production decline only slightly with trading: from US$253 million to US$244 million. Total crop production also barely declines, from 1.866 million mt to 1.729 million mt. In addition, the proportion of higher-value perennial crops increases substantially from the WR to the WRT scenarios, from 14% to 19% for grapes and from 13% to 16% for peach, for example. These results not only show the advantages of the water market approach compared to the WR case, but also to the administrative price scenario presented in the sensitivity analysis, in which water is also reallocated from agricultural to nonagricultural uses, but at a punitive cost to agricultural incomes.
In the shift from fixed proportional water rights to trade, total benefits to the basin increase from 45% of the omniscient decision-maker (BO scenario) to 80%. However, total benefits under water trading are actually even closer to the pure optimum than shown here, because no monitoring/transaction costs are charged for the omniscient decisionmaker when in fact the cost would likely be very high.
For the water-trading scenario, it is currently assumed that both buyer and seller contribute equally to the transaction costs (US$0.04 per m 3 ). Three transaction cost scenarios were run in addition to this base trading scenario: zero transaction cost, US$0.1 per m 3 , and US$0.2 per m 3 . The results are shown in Table 6 . As can be expected, water withdrawals decline with increasing transaction cost, and the volume of water traded plunges by more than half, from 278 million m 3 for the case without transaction cost to 138 million m 3 for the case with transaction cost of US$0.2 per m 3 . This is due, in part, to the fact that the transaction cost are quite high relative to the shadow prices for water, which range from US$0.18 to US$1.27 per m 3 . Total net benefits decline substantially, from US$871 million at zero transaction cost to US$755 million at transaction cost of US$0.2 per m 3 ; gains from trade also drop sharply, from US$122 million to only US$6 million, respectively. Thus, making trading more efficient (reducing transaction cost) has significant benefits, increasing both the volume and the benefits from trade.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a prototype river basin model that includes essential hydrologic, agronomic and economic relationships, and reflects the inter-relationships of water and salinity, food production, economic welfare, and environmental consequences. The model is applied to the Maipo River Basin in Chile, but due to its generic form and structure can be applied to other basins.
The model results show the benefits of water rights trading with water moving into higher valued agricultural and municipal and industrial uses. Net profits in irrigated agriculture increase substantially compared to the case of proportional use rights for demand sites. Moreover, agricultural production does not decline significantly. Net benefits for irrigation districts can be even higher than for the basin-optimizing case, as farmers reap substantial benefits from selling their unused water rights to municipal and industrial areas during the months with little or no crop production. Finally, making trading more efficient, that is, reducing transaction costs, has significant benefits, increasing both the amount of trading and the benefits from trade.
Although these preliminary results show the effectiveness of the model for policy analysis and water allocation in the river basin, additional research is needed. During a second research phase, the agricultural production functions will be extended to include inputs in addition to land, water, and irrigation technology, such as agricultural chemicals and labor. In addition, the urban water demand functions will be re-estimated based on empirical data and disaggregated into household and industrial water demands. Moreover, the power generation will be calibrated to local parameters. Based on this extension, more comprehensive policy analysis will be carried out. Existing institutions regarding water rights, priority allocations, and additional institutional realities will be better represented based on local data.
